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Introduction	In	 1939	 London	 and	 Bauer	 published	 a	 short	 pamphlet	 on	 the	 measurement	problem	 in	 quantum	 mechanics	 (London	 and	 Bauer	 1939).	 For	 many	 years,	physicists	 and	 philosophers	 took	 this	 to	 be	 merely	 a	 re-statement	 of	 von	Neumann’s	view	that	it	is	the	intervention	of	consciousness	that	somehow	leads	to	the	wave	function	collapsing	into	some	definite	state.	This	view	was	robustly	criticised	 by	 Putnam	 and	 Shimony	 in	 the	 early	 1960s	 and	 has	 been	 generally	abandoned	ever	 since.	However,	before	he	became	a	physicist,	London	studied	phenomenology	 and	 his	 work	 with	 Bauer	 is	 infused	 with	 a	 phenomenological	sensibility.	 In	(French	2002)	I	 tried	to	excavate	this	 ‘lost	history’	and	articulate	the	details	of	London’s	approach.	Here	 I	want	 to	 further	consider	 the	extent	 to	which	 this	history	might	be	said	 to	have	been	 ‘effaced’,	 to	use	Ryckman’s	 term	(Ryckman	2005)	 but	 also	 indicate	 how	 this	 phenomenological	 approach	might	be	 further	 articulated	 in	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 recent	 interpretations	 of	quantum	theory	and	thereby	be	regarded	as	a	viable	alternative.			
Recovering	‘Effaced’	History	As	 is	 well-known,	 the	 history	 of	 philosophical	 reflections	 on	 physics	 in	 the	twentieth	 century	 has	 been	 overshadowed	 by	 certain	 prominent	 views.																																																									*	Acknowledgments:	I’d	like	to	thank	Philipp	Berghofer,	Tina	Bilban,	Michel	Bitbol,	Otávio	Bueno,	Matthias	Egg,	Arezoo	Islami,	Tom	Ryckman,	Harald	Wiltsche	and	the	audience	of	the	conference	‘Phenomenological	Approaches	to	Physics’,	Graz,	June	2018,	for	comments	and	general	support.		
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Consider,	 for	example,	space-time	physics	and	in	particular	the	development	of	the	 General	 Theory	 of	 Relativity	 as	 appropriated	 by	 and	 presented	within	 the	framework	of	logical	empiricism.	Alternative	and	sometimes	intertwined	strands	of	 thought	have	been	obscured	 in	 this	history,	or,	 to	use	Ryckman’s	 term,	have	been	 ‘effaced’.	 Thus	 he	 charts	 the	 role	 of	 neo-Kantian	 and	 phenomenological	thought	 in	 philosophical	 reflections	 on	 Einstein’s	 theory,	 thereby	 helping	 to	recover	this	‘effaced’	history	(Ryckman	2005).	In	particular,	he	focuses	on	Weyl’s	adoption	 of	 an	 explicitly	 phenomenological	 stance	 with	 respect	 to	 both	 the	relevant	physics	and	 its	philosophical	 interpretation,	where	this	shift	 ‘reflect[s]	the	 theory’s	 ambiguous	 character	 as	 lying	 in	 the	 intersection	 of	 physics	 and	philosophy’	 (ibid.,	 p.	 159).	 I	 shall	 consider	 whether	 a	 similar	 ambiguity	 of	character	 can	be	ascertained	 in	 the	 case	of	London	and	Bauer’s	 analysis	of	 the	measurement	problem	in	quantum	mechanics.		 Here	 too,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 quantum	 physics	 more	 generally,	 we	 have	seen	the	recovery	of	a	history	that	has	effectively	been	smothered	by	positivistic	construals	of	the	infamous	‘Copenhagen	Interpretation’	for	example.	Recently,	a	neo-Kantian	perspective	has	been	recovered	in	the	work	of	Cassirer	(1936;	see	Ryckman	 2018),	 which	 has	 been	 appropriated	 by	 more	 recent	 (and	 broadly	realist)	 philosophical	 stances	 (see	 French	 2014).	 The	 natural	 question	 arises	whether	 there	 are	 also	 phenomenological	 strands	 to	 this	 history	 that	 can	 be	brought	into	the	light	and	in	(French	2002)	I	argued	that	there	are,	as	manifested	most	clearly	in	London	and	Bauer’s	pamphlet	(1939)1.	In	the	next	section	I	will	sketch	the	‘usual	story’	of	this	problem	and	the	purported	role	of	consciousness	in	resolving	it.		
The	Measurement	Problem:	Usual	Story	The	usual	story	that	we	tell	about	the	measurement	problem	is	often	illustrated	by	Schrödinger’s	 famous	 ‘cat	 in	a	box’	 thought	experiment2:	a	cat	 is	placed	 in	a	box,	 together	 with	 a	 portion	 of	 radioactive	 material	 and	 a	 Geiger	 counter																																																									1	Originally	published	in	French	and	subsequently	republished	in	English	translation	in	Wheeler	and	Zurek	1983.	2	This	amounts	to	a	kind	of	appropriation	of	the	thought	experiment	as	Schrödinger’s	original	intention	was	to	undermine	Bohr’s	insistence	on	the	distinction	between	macroscopic	and	microscopic	systems,	with	classical	physics	applying	to	the	former	and	quantum	theory	to	the	latter.		
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connected	to	a	device	that	will	release	poison	if	triggered.	If	the	material	decays,	the	Geiger	counter	is	fired,	the	poison	is	released	and	the	cat	dies;	if	not,	the	cat	continues	 to	 live.	 According	 to	 quantum	mechanics,	 the	 state	 of	 the	 system	 of	radioactive	 atoms	 must	 be	 described	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 superposition	 of	 possible	states,	 whose	 evolution	will	 be	 governed	 by	 Schrödinger’s	 equation.	 But	 then,	noted	 Schrödinger,	 the	 radioactive	 material	 +	 Geiger	 counter	 can	 also	 be	considered	 as	 a	 system	 and	 its	 state	 must	 be	 described	 in	 terms	 of	 a	superposition,	 and	 likewise	 for	 the	 radioactive	 material	 +	 Geiger	 counter	 +	poison-releasing-device	 and	 so	 on,	 to	 include,	 of	 course,	 the	 unfortunate	 cat.	Thus,	 Schrödinger	 remarks,	 ‘…	 an	 indeterminacy	 originally	 restricted	 to	 the	atomic	domain	becomes	transformed	into	macroscopic	indeterminacy’	(Trimmer	1980,	 p.	 328).	 But	 of	 course,	 he	 continues,	 when	 we	 open	 the	 box	 the	indeterminacy	is	resolved	–	we	observe	either	a	live	or	a	dead	cat.		 von	Neumann,	equally	 famously,	enshrined	 this	 transformation	 in	 terms	of	 his	 distinction	 between	 Processes	 of	 the	 First	 Kind,	 which	 apply	 to	measurement,	 as	 represented	 in	 Schrödinger’s	 thought	 experiment	 by	 opening	the	 box,	 and	which	 are	 indeterministic,	 discontinuous	 and	 thermodynamically	irreversible	and	Processes	of	the	Second	Kind,	as	represented	by	the	evolution	of	the	wave	function	representing	the	state	of	the	system,	which	are	deterministic,	continuous	 in	 time	 and	 reversible	 (1932).	 However,	 to	 formally	 represent	 the	distinction	 this	way	 does	 little,	 if	 anything,	 to	 resolve	 the	 problem,	 expressed,	pithily	as	ever,	by	Albert	in	the	following	terms:	‘The	dynamics	and	the	postulate	of	collapse	are	flatly	in	contradiction	with	one	another	...	the	postulate	of	collapse	seems	 to	be	 right	 about	what	happens	when	we	make	measurements,	 and	 the	dynamics	 seems	 to	 be	 bizarrely	 wrong	 about	 what	 happens	 when	 we	 make	measurements,	 and	 yet	 the	 dynamics	 seems	 to	 be	 right	 about	 what	 happens	whenever	we	aren't	making	measurements.’	(Albert	1994,	p.	79)		 von	 Neumann,	 of	 course,	 would	 most	 likely	 respond	 that	 it	 is	 not	 so	bizarre	that	the	dynamics,	as	represented	by	Schrödinger’s	equation,	gets	things	so	wrong	when	it	comes	to	measurement	because	measurement	culminates	in	an	observation	 and	 observation	 involves	 a	 kind	 of	 interaction	 that	 cannot	 be	captured	 in	 quantum	 mechanical	 terms,	 namely	 one	 involving	 a	 conscious	
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observer.3	Indeed,	he	presented	an	argument	–	his	famous	‘Chain	Argument’	–	to	that	 effect:	 if	 we	 assume	 that	 quantum	 mechanics	 applies	 to	 all	 physical	systems4,	 then	 it	 will	 apply	 to,	 for	 example,	 the	 radioactive	 material	 and	 the	radioactive	 material	 +	 Geiger	 counter	 and	 the	 radioactive	 material	 +	 Geiger	counter	+	poison-releasing-device	and	so	on	up	the	chain,	to	include	the	physical	body	 of	 the	 observer	 opening	 the	 box,	 encompassing	 her	 visual	 system	 and	brain.	All	the	links	in	this	chain	will	be	embraced	by	the	superposition	and	thus	can	 be	 taken	 as	 subject	 to	 Processes	 of	 the	 Second	 Kind.	 What	 then	 could	generate	 a	 definite	 result	 when	 the	 box	 is	 opened?	 Something	 non-physical,	namely	 the	 consciousness	 of	 the	 observer,	 which	 is	 not	 subject	 to	 quantum	mechanics,	 cannot	 be	 included	 in	 the	 superposition	 and,	 in	 effect,	 leads	 to	 the	‘collapse’	 of	 the	 relevant	 wave	 function	 (describing	 the	 entire	 system	 from	radioactive	material	to	the	cat	and	the	brain	of	the	observer).			 Continuing	 to	 follow	 ‘the	 usual	 story’,	 this	 postulation	 of	 the	 role	 of	consciousness,	 about	 which	 von	 Neumann	 did	 not	 actually	 say	 anything	 (see	Bueno	 forthcoming),	 was	 (so	 the	 story	 goes)	 summarised	 and	 presented	 in	 a	little	 pamphlet	 by	 London	 and	 Bauer	 (London	 and	 Bauer	 1939/1983)5	 and	generated	 considerable	 discussion,	 not	 all	 of	 it	 either	 philosophically	 or	physically	 sophisticated,	 about	 the	 observer-dependence	 of	 quantum	 physics.	More	 significantly	 it	 was	 brought	 to	 the	 attention	 of	 philosophers	 of	 physics	through	the	advocacy	of	Wigner	(I’ll	come	back	to	this	below)	who	invoked	it	in	his	 own,	 also	 famous,	 argument	 for	 the	 role	 of	 consciousness,	 based	 on	 the	‘Wigner’s	 Friend’	 thought	 experiment:	 portrayed	 as	 an	 extension	 of	 the	‘Schrödinger’s	 Cat’	 case	 sketched	 above,	we	 are	 invited	 to	 imagine	 someone	 –	Wigner’s	friend	–	 	about	to	open	the	box	containing	the	cat,	the	Geiger	counter,	the	radioactive	material	etc.,	but	in	a	room	that	is	sealed	with	a	further	observer	outside	 the	 room.	The	observer	 outside	 the	 room	asks	her	 friend	whether	 she	saw	 the	 cat	 alive,	 say,	 knowing	 that	 quantum	 mechanics	 predicts	 a	 50%	probability	 of	 observing	 such	 an	 outcome.	 The	 observer	 now	 asks	 her	 friend	
																																																								3	Albert	of	course	was	writing	at	a	time	when	measurement	had	come	to	be	regarded	as	just	another	interaction.		4	An	assumption	that	Bohr	would	reject	of	course;	for	a	useful	account	see	Freire	2015,	p.	147.	5	This	characterisation	of	the	London	and	Bauer	manuscript	can	be	found	scattered	throughout	the	relevant	literature;	see	Atmanspacher	2015.	
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what	she	observed	before	she	was	asked	that	question,	and	we	would	expect	her	to	reply,	“I	already	told	you,	I	saw	the	cat	alive”,	since	the	question	whether	she	did	or	did	not	see	the	cat	alive	was	already	decided	in	her	mind	before	she	was	asked	 (Wigner	 1961).	 And	 here	 Wigner	 cites	 in	 support	 a	 specific	 line	 from	London	and	Bauer’s	pamphlet,	one	that	I	shall	return	to	later:	‘He	[the	observe	in	the	room]	possesses	a	characteristic	and	quite	familiar	faculty	which	we	can	call	the	“faculty	of	introspection.”	He	can	keep	track	from	moment	to	moment	of	his	own	state.’	(London	and	Bauer	19383,	p.	252)	Since	the	issue	as	to	what	she	saw	was	already	decided	in	the	friend’s	mind	before	the	question	was	asked,	the	state	immediately	after	the	interaction	between	the	friend	and	the	whole	cat-in-a-box	system	 cannot	 be	 a	 superposition.	 Thus,	Wigner	 concludes,	 ‘It	 follows	 that	 the	being	 with	 a	 consciousness	 must	 have	 a	 different	 role	 in	 quantum	mechanics	than	the	inanimate	measuring	device	...’		(Wigner	op.	cit.)		 It	 was	 primarily	 by	 means	 of	 Wigner’s	 work	 that	 this	 ‘solution’	 to	 the	measurement	 problem,	 and	 the	 piece	 by	 London	 and	 Bauer	 in	 particular,	 was	brought	 to	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 likes	 of	 Shimony	 and	 Putnam	 (Shimony	 1963;	Putnam	1964)	who	subjected	it	to	severe	criticism,	raising	the	kinds	of	questions	that	many	of	us	 like	 to	 invite	our	 students	 to	 consider,	 such	as	how,	precisely,	does	consciousness,	being	non-physical,	 cause	a	physical	 change	 in	 the	state	of	the	 system?	 And	 how	 can	 the	 universe	 as	 a	 whole	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 quantum	system?	Wigner,	 together	 with	Margenau,	 attempted	 to	 respond	 to	 these,	 and	other,	 concerns	 but	 Putnam’s	 and	 Shimony’s	 critiques	 became	 entrenched	 and	with	 its	 apparent	 adherence	 to	 a	 philosophically	 naive	 form	 of	 mind-body	dualism,	this	solution	to	the	measurement	problem	was	subsequently	dropped,	in	favour	of	the	now	well-known	alternatives.	End	of	story.		 However,	 as	 I	 argued	 in	 (French	 2002)	 the	 ‘usual	 story’	 is	 wrong	 in	 at	least	one	crucial	respect:	London	and	Bauer’s	pamphlet	is	not	a	mere	summary	of	 von	 Neumann’s	 position	 and	 interpreted	 correctly,	 it	 offers	 a	 much	 more	sophisticated	account	of	measurement	which,	being	grounded	in	the	tradition	of	Husserlian	phenomenology,	is	capable	of	responding	to	Putnam’s	and	Shimony’s	criticisms.	Let	me	now	outline	this	alternative	narrative.		
London	and	Bauer’s	Pamphlet:	the	‘True’	Story	
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Fritz	 London’s	 scientific	 biography	 has	 been	 presented	 in	 admirable	 detail	 by	Gavroglu	 (1995)	 and	 can	 be	 briefly	 summarised	 as	 follows6:	 he	 studied	 with	Sommerfeld	 at	 Munich	 and	 might	 be	 characterised	 as	 one	 of	 the	 first	 post-revolutionary	quantum	physicists,	applying	the	theory	to	chemical	bonding	with	Heitler	and	developing	quantum	models	of	superconductivity	and	superfluidity.	The	 development	 of	 such	models	 has	 a	 direct	 bearing	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 how	 to	approach	 the	 measurement	 problem	 since	 they	 were	 taken	 by	 some	 as	undermining	 Bohr’s	 approach,	 grounded	 in	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	macroscopic	and	the	microscopic,	with	classical	theory	applicable	to	the	former	and	quantum	mechanics	to	the	latter.	London’s	work	helped	to	suggest	to	many	that	 such	 a	 hard	 and	 fast	 distinction	 was	 simply	 not	 viable.	 Furthermore,	 the	‘Sommerfeld	School’	was	quite	distinctive	from	the	Copenhagen	group,	famously	centred	 around	 Bohr,	 not	 least	 because	 of	 the	 former’s	 emphasis	 on	 puzzle	solving	rather	than	broader,	foundational	issues	(Seth	2010).	Indeed,	the	above	characterisation	 of	 London	 as	 a	 post-revolutionary	 is	 in	 a	 sense	 wide	 of	 the	mark,	 since,	 as	 Seth	 nicely	 sets	 out,	 there	 was	 no	 sense	 of	 ‘crisis’	 within	 the	Sommerfeld	 School	 and	 hence,	 he	 argues7,	 the	 very	 attribution	 of	 a	 quantum	‘revolution’	is	inappropriate	in	this	particular	academic	context.			 Significantly,	 London	brought	 to	 his	work	 in	 physics	 an	 acute	 and	well-formed	 philosophical	 sensitivity	 that	 he	 had	 begun	 to	 develop	 prior	 to	 his	scientific	studies	(for	further	details	see	again	Gavroglu	1995).		His	early	essays,	written	 over	 a	 period	 covering	 his	 final	 year	 of	 school	 and	 the	 first	 year	 of	university,	reveal	Kantian	and	phenomenological	themes	(Gavroglu,	ibid.	esp.	pp.	8-23).	While	at	Munich	London	met	Pfänder,	 the	 leader	of	 the	Munich	group	of	phenomenologists	 and	 second	 only	 to	 Husserl	 within	 the	 phenomenological	movement	 (ibid.,	 pp.	 11-12).	 Pfänder	 was	 so	 impressed	 with	 an	 essay	 that	London	 showed	 him	 that	 he	 urged	 him	 to	 write	 it	 up	 and	 submit	 it	 as	 a	
																																																								6	As	in	(French	2002)	I	shall	not	say	much	about	Bauer,	although	I	will	add	that	in	1933	he	published	an	introduction	to	group	theory	and	its	application	to	quantum	mechanics	(Meijer	and	Bauer	1962)	which	is	significant, of course, because of London’s involvement with group theory in 
the late 1920s (Gavroglu op. cit., pp. 53-57).	7	In	a	sense	this	is	a	warning	to	those,	like	Kuhn,	who	are	seduced	by	what	Seth	calls	‘the	romance	of	revolution’	and	fail	to	note	or	acknowledge	the	differences	in	approach	and	attitude	of	different	‘schools’	of	physics	at	the	time	and,	indeed,	different	physicists.		
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dissertation	 in	philosophy.8	London’s	 thesis	was	then	published	 in	1923	 in	 the	
Jarbuch	 für	Philosophie	und	phaenomenlogische	Forschung,	which	was	co-edited	by	 Pfänder	 with	 Husserl	 as	 editor-in-chief	 and	 according	 to	 Gavroglu,	 ‘[t]he	dominant	features	of	Fritz	London’s	thesis	place	it	within	the	phenomenological	movement	...’	(ibid.,	p.	15).	9		 It	 is	 this	 philosophical	 sensitivity	 that	 London	 brings	 to	 bear	 on	 the	measurement	 problem	 in	 the	 pamphlet	 with	 Bauer.	 Before	 getting	 into	 the	details,	 it	 is	 worth	 bearing	 in	 mind	 two	 points	 regarding	 the	 relationship	between	 his	 scientific	 and	 philosophical	 work.	 One	 might	 question	 whether	 a	philosophical	 view	 developed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 classical	 physics	 can	 offer	 an	appropriate	 framework	 for	 the	 revolutionary	 new	 theory	 that	 replaced	 that	context.	However,	as	just	noted,	the	Munich	‘ethos’	was	to	treat	the	development	of	the	new	quantum	mechanics	as	another	problem	solving	exercise,	using	tools	adapted	from	those	applicable	to	classical	physics.	There	was	no	sense	of	‘crisis’	or	even	of	a	revolution	taking	place10	and	I	suggest	that	just	as	in	his	physics,	so	in	 his	 philosophy,	 London	would	 have	 felt	 it	 entirely	 appropriate	 to	 apply	 the	same	philosophical	devices	as	he	had	used	before.11			 One	might	also	worry	that	following	the	publication	of	Husserl’s	Crisis	of	
European	 Sciences	 and	 Transcendental	 Phenomenology	 (1936/1970)12,	 London	might	 have	 had	 further	 reason	 to	 feel	 that	 it	may	 have	 been	 inappropriate	 to	apply	a	phenomenological	perspective	to	this	new	highly	mathematised	theory.	After	all,	 it	 is	 in	 the	Crisis	 that	Husserl	 famously	emphasizes	 the	 importance	of	the	 ‘lifeworld’,	 conceived	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 ‘natural’,	 pre-theoretical	 understanding	that	has	been	overlaid	with	the	‘mathematisation’	initiated	during	the	Scientific																																																									8	Shimony	suggests	that	it	was	London’s	brother,	Heinz,	who	encouraged	him	to	then	go	into	physics	(Shimony	in	AIP	Oral	History	Interviews,	2002).	9	According	to	Gavroglu,	‘What	London	was	thinking	programmatically	in	1921	was	very	close	to	Husserl’s	thoughts.	In	this	sense	London’s	problematique	was	not	marginal	at	all.’	(op.	cit.	pp.	13-14).	10	Seth	suggests	that	in	his	interviews	with	those	quantum	physicists	still	alive	at	the	time,	one	gets	a	sense	of	Kuhn	posing	leading	questions	in	his	efforts	to	elicit	a	sense	that	a	revolution	took	place!	11	Gavroglu	(1995)	has	also	emphasised	the	similarities	between	London’s	philosophical	and	physical	concerns,	particularly	with	regard	to	the	treatment	of	theories	as	‘wholes’.	He	cites	Mormann’s	claim	that	London’s	1923	thesis	‘[...I	can	be	considered	as	a	set-theoretic	concretization	of	Husserl’s	largely	programmatic	account	of	a	macrological	philosophy	of	science’	(Mormann,	1991,	p.	70;	his	emphasis).	 12	Some	have	argued	that	this	represents	a	major	break	with	his	earlier	work;	others	that	it	offers	a	fresh	perspective	on	it	motivated	by	the	socio-political	context	of	the	time.		
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Revolution.	 It	 is	 ultimately	 due	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 infinite	manifold	 via	this	mathematisation	 that	modern	science	has	been	plunged	 into	 ‘crisis’,	 in	 the	sense	of	a	‘loss	of	its	meaning	for	life’.13	Here	the	suggestion	that	just	as	London,	following	Sommerfeld	and	his	school,	saw	no	crisis	in	physics,	so	he	would	have	seen	none	from	a	phenomenological	perspective,	might	justifiably	be	viewed	as	somewhat	 facile.	 What	 Husserl	 was	 concerned	 with	 went	 much	 deeper	 and	further	back	 in	history	 than	 the	 latest	developments	 in	quantum	physics,	 back	indeed	to	the	arithmetization	of	geometry	which	thereby	emptied	the	latter	of	its	meaning.	 Indeed,	Husserl	might	well	have	viewed	 the	use	of	group	 theory	 that	was	 so	 favoured	 by	 London	 as	 exemplifying	 this	 tendency	 and	 contributing	 to	the	 ‘crisis’!	 Of	 course	 we	 could	 always	 effectively	 exclude	 The	 Crisis	 of	 the	
European	Sciences	…	from	consideration	in	reconstructing	the	phenomenological	basis	of	London	and	Bauer’s	approach,	perhaps	on	the	grounds	that	it	appeared	long	after	London’s	education	in	phenomenology	and	at	a	time	when	he	was	fully	committed	to	the	quantum	project.	But	perhaps	that	would	be	too	quick.	At	the	very	least	we	would	expect	London	to	be	sympathetic	to	Husserl’s	insistence	on	an	examination	of	 the	 ‘original	meaning-giving	achievement’	of	mathematics	as	applied	 to	 physics.	 Perhaps,	 then,	 we	 can	 understand	 London	 and	 Bauer’s	 re-insertion	of	consciousness	into	quantum	theory	as	a	response	to	Husserl’s	call	to	restore	the	subjective-relative	to	physics.	Indeed,	it	is	the	relative	aspect	that	is	absolutely	crucial	as	we	shall	now	see.14			 Let	me	begin	by	noting	 their	 reconceptualisation	of	quantum	mechanics	as	implying	a	theory	of	knowledge:	they	write,			‘Without	 intending	to	set	up	a	theory	of	knowledge,	although	they	were	guided	by	a	rather	questionable	philosophy,	physicists	were	so	to	speak	trapped	in	spite	of	themselves	into	discovering	that	the	formalism	of	quantum	mechanics	already	implies	 a	 well-defined	 theory	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 object	 and	 the	observer,	a	relation	quite	different	from	that	implicit	in	naïve	realism,	which	had																																																									13	Egg	draws	an	interesting	parallel	between	Husserl’s	concerns	and	those	motivating	certain	current	forms	of	the	‘metaphysics	of	science’	(Egg	this	volume).	14	Føllesdal	argues	that	science	and	the	lifeworld	should	not	be	seen	as	being	in	opposition,	since	the	latter	mediates	the	reference	to	reality	of	concepts	of	the	former	and	acts	as	the	relevant	touchstone	through	scientific	revolutions,	say	(Follesdal	1990);	see	also	Bilban	(forthcoming)	and	Egg	(this	volume).	
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seemed,	until	then,	one	of	the	indispensable	foundation	stones	of	every	science.’	(1983,	 p.	 220).	Note	 the	 reference	 to	 ‘a	 rather	 questionable	 philosophy’	 at	 the	beginning	of	this	passage	–	it	may	be	that	London	and	Bauer	are	referring	here	to	the	 positivistically	 inclined	 approach	 of	 Heisenberg	 in	 his	 work	 on	 matrix	mechanics,	or	the	curious	admixture	of	different	philosophical	strands	in	Bohr’s	thought15	 or,	 more	 likely	 perhaps,	 to	 a	 general	 stance	 within	 science	 of	supposing	 that	objectivity	meant	excising	 the	subjective.	Despite	such	a	stance,	they	write,	 the	 formalism	 itself	 implies	 a	 specific	 relationship	 between	 subject	and	object.	Note	also	 their	 insistence	 that	 this	 relationship	 is	not	 that	which	 is	supposed	by	‘naïve	realism’,	underpinned	as	it	is	by	the	firm	distinction	between	the	 inner	(subjective)	and	outer	(objective).	And	note,	 in	sum	and	significantly,	their	 core	 point	 that	 quantum	 mechanics	 is	 not	 to	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 merely	another	 theory	 that	 can	 be	 straightforwardly	 evaluated	 in	 terms	 of	 various	epistemological	approaches;	rather,	it	itself	embodies	a	particular	such	approach.			 The	 nature	 of	 that	 approach	 is	 then	 revealed	 by	 consideration	 of	 the	measurement	situation.	Here,	London	and	Bauer	note	 ‘the	essential	role	played	by	 the	 consciousness	of	 the	observer’	 in	 the	 transition	 from	 the	 superposition,	ascribed	by	the	theory	to	the	cat	+	Geiger	counter	+	etc	etc.,	to	the	pure	state,	in	terms	of	which	we	 characterise	 a	definite	 result,	 such	 as	 ‘cat	 alive’.	 Looking	 at	that	 situation	 from	 ‘outside’,	 as	 it	were,	 they	write:	 ‘Objectively	 -	 that	 is,	 for	us	who	consider	as	“object”	the	combined	system	[object,	apparatus,	observer]	-	the	situation	 seems	 little	 changed	 to	what	we	 just	met	when	we	were	 considering	only	apparatus	and	object.’	(ibid.,	p.	251).	However,	they	continue,	
 ‘The	observer	has	a	completely	different	impression.	For	him	it	is	only	the	object	
x	 and	 the	 apparatus	 y	 that	 belong	 to	 the	 external	 world,	 to	 what	 he	 calls	“objectivity.”	 By	 contrast	 he	 has	 with	 himself	 relations	 of	 a	 very	 special	character.	He	possesses	a	characteristic	and	quite	familiar	faculty	which	we	can	call	the	“faculty	of	introspection.”	He	can	keep	track	from	moment	to	moment	of	his	own	state.	By	virtue	of	 this	 “immanent	knowledge”	he	attributes	 to	himself	
																																																								15	Although	see	Bilban	(forthcoming)	for	an	interesting	and	useful	analysis	of	Bohr’s	thought	from	a	phenomenological	perspective.		
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the	 right	 to	 create	 his	 own	 objectivity	 -	 that	 is,	 to	 cut	 the	 chain	 of	 statistical	correlations	…	’	(ibid.,	p.	252)		Note	here	the	distinction	between	the	observer’s	relations	with	the	system	and	with	himself,	the	latter	having	a	‘very	special	character’.	This	is	embodied	in	the	‘characteristic	 and	quite	 familiar’	 faculty	 of	 introspection	 in	 terms	of	which	he	has	immanent	knowledge	of	his	own	state;	that	is,	knowledge	that	is	indubitable.	Here	we	see	London	and	Bauer’s	adherence	to	the	phenomenological	norm:						‘…	 to	 avail	 ourselves	 of	 nothing	 but	 what	 in	 consciousness	 we	 can	 make	essentially	evident	in	its	pure	immanence’	(Husserl1913/83,	p.	59).			 Attention	 should	 also	 be	 drawn	 to	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 free	 creation	 of	objectivity	 in	 this	 account.	 In	 a	 note	 added	 by	 London	 we	 find	 the	 following:	‘Accordingly,	we	will	 label	 this	 creative	 action	 as	 “making	 objective.”	 By	 it	 the	observer	establishes	his	own	framework	of	objectivity	and	acquires	a	new	piece	of	 information	 about	 the	 object	 in	 question.’	 (London,	 added	 note;	 ibid.)	 This	bears	 obvious	 comparison	 with	 Husserl’s	 statement	 that	 ‘...	 we	 persistently	
create	 for	 ourselves	 new	 configurations	 of	 objects	 ...	 which	 have	 for	 us	 lasting	reality.	 If	we	 engage	 in	 radical	 self-examination	 -	 that	 is,	 return	 to	our	 ego	 ...	 -	then	all	these	forms	are	seen	to	be	creations	of	spontaneous	“I”-activity	...	There	we	also	find	all	 the	sciences,	which,	 through	my	own	thinking	and	perceiving,	 I	bring	to	reality	within	myself’	(Husserl	1929/1964,	p.	30;	my	emphasis).	Again,	I	shall	come	back	to	this	aspect	of	London	and	Bauer’s	account.		 It	 should	 now	 be	 obvious	 that	 what	 is	 involved	 in	 the	 ‘cutting’	 of	 the	‘chain’	 of	 statistical	 correlations	 is	 not	 as	 typically	 characterised	 on	 the	 ‘usual	story’	 sketched	 above,	 namely	 consciousness	 intervening	 and	 mysteriously	causing	the	collapse	of	the	wave	function.	Indeed,	London	and	Bauer	themselves	are	quite	explicit	on	this	point:	
 ‘...	 it	 is	not	a	mysterious	 interaction	between	 the	apparatus	and	 the	object	 that	produces	 a	 new	 y	 for	 the	 system	 during	 the	 measurement.	 It	 is	 only	 the	consciousness	of	an	“I”	who	can	separate	himself	from	the	former	function  Ψ(x,	
y,	z)	 	 and,	 by	 virtue	of	 his	 observation,	 set	 up	 [‘constituer’]	 a	 new	objectivity	 in	attributing	to	the	object	henceforward	a	new	function		y(x)	=	uk(x).’(1983,	p.	252) 
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 In	 French	 (2002)	 I	 suggested	 that	 in	 the	 light	 of	 this,	 the	 transition	 from	 a	superposition	to	a	definite	state	might	be	more	suitably	characterised	in	terms	of	a	 mutual	 separation	 of	 both	 the	 ‘ego-pole’	 and	 the	 ‘object-pole’	 through	 this	familiar	 act	 of	 introspection.	 As	 a	 characteristic	 act	 of	 reflection	 on	 the	observation,	this	yields	a	relational	act,	in	which	the	ego	appears	as	itself	related	to	the	object	of	the	act	through	this	act	 itself.	 It	 is	of	the	essence	of	such	an	act	and	of	the	immanent	knowledge	that	it	yields	that	the	ego	should	appear	as	one	pole	but	this	should	not	be	taken	as	implying	that	the	ego	is	to	be	conceived	of	as	something	 substantial,	 over	 and	 above	 or	 existing	 prior	 to	 this	 act.	 Rather	 it	should	be	thought	of	as	a	non-autonomous	centre	of	identity	or	subject-pole	that	stands	at	one	end	of	the	relational	act,	the	other	relatum	of	which	is	the	object.	The	 latter	 is	 then	 ‘made	 objective’,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 having	 a	 definite	 state	attributed	to	it,	by	this	objectifying	act	of	reflection,	thereby	cutting	the	‘chain	of	statistical	correlations’.			 Given	 this,	we	can	now	return	 to	 the	situation	of	Wigner’s	 ‘friend’.	Here	we	need	to	recall	a	crucial	Husserlian	point,	namely	that	between	‘living	in’	the	observation,	as	an	experience,	and	describing	it,	an	essential	descriptive	change	occurs.		In	making	such	a	description	we	are	no	longer	‘living	in’	the	observation,	but	 instead	we	attend	to	 it	and	pass	 judgment	on	 it	and	 in	doing	so	we	cannot	avoid	reference	to	an	ego	or	 ‘I’.	Thus,	 in	such	a	description,	performed	after	an	‘objectifying	act	of	reflection’,	the	ego	is	‘inescapable’	since	it	necessarily	appears	as	 related	 to	 the	 object	 of	 the	 act	 of	 observation.	 What	 the	 friend	 set-up	illuminates,	 from	 this	 perspective,	 is	 precisely	 that	 descriptive	 shift:	 	 normally	we	do	not	explicitly	‘keep	track’	of	our	mental	states,	e.g.	in	the	sense	of	making	a	note	of	them,	but	what	Wigner’s	argument	illustrates	is	that	we	do	possess	this	‘characteristic	 faculty’	 and	 can	 say	what	 our	 state	 is,	 if	 needs	 be.	 Of	 course,	 in	observing	 his	 ‘friend’,	 Wigner’s	 consciousness	 will	 also	 separate	 from	 the	relevant	superposition	and	he	will	then	set	up	a	new	objectivity.		 We	can	also	see	how	Putnam’s	and	Shimony’s	objections	are	wide	of	the	mark.	First	of	all,	the	observer	is	included	within	the	remit	of	the	theory	–	she	is	not	something	beyond	or	outside	of	it,	that	mysteriously	intervenes	to	somehow	‘cause’	the	wave	function	to	collapse.	Of	course	there	is	more	to	say	(see	French	
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forthcoming)	but	it	is	also	not	the	case	that	the	separation	of	the	ego	places	the	observer	beyond	the	theory	prior	to	the	observation.	At	the	point	of	observation,	there	is	a	separation	but	only	in	the	above	sense	that	the	object	and	subject	poles	of	the	relationship	between	the	knower	and	the	world	emerge.	It	is	certainly	not	the	case	that	the	ego	or	consciousness	lies	outwith	the	situation	before	and	after,	acting	in	some	way	to	bring	about	a	definite	result.	Thus	consciousness	does	not	‘affect’	nature	 in	a	peculiar	way	and	there	 is	no	 ‘mysterious	 interaction’;	rather	as	 sketched	above,	 there	 is	 a	 separation	of	 system	and	observer.	 Furthermore,	there	can	be	no	superposition	of	mental	states	of	the	‘I’	since	the	‘I’	can	only	be	said	 to	appear	post-separation	and	relatedly,	 there	can	be	no	(internal)	mental	process	of	reduction.			 The	 criticisms	 are	hence	 side-stepped	and	Shimony,	 at	 least,	 appears	 to	have	 acknowledged	 this,	 eventually,	 writing	 that,	 ‘In	 view	 of	 London's	philosophical	training	as	a	student	of	Husserl,	however,	we	now	are	inclined	to	believe	 that	 the	 attribution	 [of	 the	 usual	 story	 of	 wave	 function	 reduction	 via	consciousness)	 is	 incorrect	 and	 that	 the	 passage	 quoted	 [the	 one	 above	beginning	 ‘…	 it	 is	 not	 a	 mysterious	 interaction	 …’	 ]	 	 should	 be	 given	 a	phenomenological	 interpretation.’	 (Shimony	 1977,	 pp.	 760-761,	 fn	 7).16	Likewise,	 in	 his	 interview	 for	 the	 American	 Institute	 of	 Physics	 Oral	 History	Archives,	 he	 says,	 	 ‘As	 a	 student	 of	 Husserl,	 there	 were	 some	 residues	 of	phenomenology	in	the	little	booklet	of	London	and	Bauer.	’	(Shimony	in	AIP	Oral	
History	 Interviews,	 2002;	 the	 interview	was	 conducted	 by	 Joan	 Bromberg	who	unfortunately	does	not	follow	up	on	this	remark	of	Shimony’s).17		
																																																								16	It	is	perhaps	worth	mentioning	that	this	is	a	bit	of	an	odd	paper,	especially	from	today’s	perspective,	concerned	as	it	is	with	the	possibility	of	using	quantum	entanglement	to	demonstrate	telepathy.	A	useful	context	is	Kaiser	2011.	17	The	use	of	the	word	‘residue’	is	interesting	here,	particularly	given	Shimony’s	earlier	acknowledgement.	He	also	says	that	the	‘…booklet	was	more	explicit	about	the	intervention	of	mentality	in	the	measurement	process	than	von	Neumann	is	…’	(Shimony	in	AIP	Oral	History	
Interviews,	2002)	because	of	London’s	interest	in	phenomenology. Shimony	goes	on	to	describe	how	he	translated	London	and	Bauer’s	pamphlet	from	the	original	French	and	used	it	in	his	class	at	MIT	in	the	late	1950s.	He	also	states	that	Wigner	was	keen	to	see	the	English	translation	published	with	an	introduction	by	himself	and	that	Bauer	liked	the	translation	(London	of	course	had	sadly	died	by	then)	but	that	the	original	publishers	declined,	because,	Shimony	speculates,	they	wanted	to	publish	it	themselves.	As	he	notes,	they	thereby	lost	the	opportunity	to	have	it	published	with	commentary	by	Wigner	(it	was	subsequently	published	in	the	Wheeler	and	Zurek	collection	of	course).	As	Shimiony	goes	on	to	admit,	it	was	the	London	and	Bauer	pamphlet	that	led	him	into	the	measurement	problem	and	his	paper	‘On	the	Role	of	the	Observer	in	Quantum	
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The	‘Effacement’/Co-Option	of	Phenomenology	Given	 my	 claim	 (again,	 expanded	 in	 French	 2002),	 and	 the	 brief	 discussion	above,	 the	 question	 arises:	 why	 was	 the	 phenomenological	 underpinning	 of	London’s	 approach	 to	 the	measurement	 problem	 so	 comprehensively	 ignored,	noted	only	(so	far	as	I	know)	by	a	critical	commentator	(namely,	Shimony)	much	later?18	Here	I	cannot	hope	to	give	anything	close	to	a	complete	answer	but	can	only	suggest	some	relevant	strands	of	thought,	of	a	rather	speculative	nature.		 One	feature	of	the	relevant	historical	period	has	to	do	with	what	might	be	seen	 as	 a	move	 from	 foundations	 to	 pragmatics:	 with	 the	 combination	 of	 von	Neumann’s	 reconciliation	 of	 matrix	 and	 wave	 mechanics	 and	 Bohr’s	 apparent	victory	 in	 his	 debate	 with	 Einstein,	 attention	 shifted	 to	 the	 more	 ‘practical’	applications	of	the	theory,	a	shift	also	powered	by	the	move	in	centre	of	gravity	of	 quantum	 physics	 from	 Germany	 to	 the	 USA.	 With	 that	 shift	 various	philosophical	nuances	may	have	been	lost.	There’s	also	the	further	point	that,	as	Gooday	 and	 Mitchell	 (2013)	 argue,	 the	 distinction	 between	 classical	 and	quantum	physics	 itself	only	emerged	over	a	 long	period	of	time,	extending	into	the	1930s,	and	was	dependent	on	the	geographical	 location	considered,	a	point	that	 meshes	 with	 Seth’s	 claim	 noted	 above.	 Thus,	 although	 many	 physics	textbooks	tend	to	emphasise	the	classical/modern	distinction	as	representing	a	distinctive	 conceptual	 break,	 or	 revolutionary	moment,	 others,	 and	 sometimes	the	 same	 books,	 note	 the	 continuities	 in	 theoretical	 practice.	 Indeed,	 the	distinction	 gets	 applied	 in	 different	 ways	 to	 emphasise	 either	 continuity	 or	change,	 depending	 on	 the	 pedagogical	 or	 more	 broadly	 cultural	 aims	 and	interests	 involved,	 yielding	 different	 versions	 of	 what	 was	 characterised	 as	‘classical’	and	‘modern’	physics.				 The	 conclusion	 Gooday	 and	 Mitchell	 draw	 is	 that	 classical	 physics	 can	only	 be	 understood	 to	 have	 existed	 in	 the	 limited	 sense	 that	 the	 label	 was	developed	and	attributed	by	theoreticians	in	the	early	twentieth	century	‘…who																																																									Theory’	was	initially	presented	at	a	conference	on	the	foundations	of	quantum	mechanics	organised	by	Podolsky	in	Cincinnati	in	1963,	with	the	likes	of	Wigner,	Dirac	and	Bohm	present. 18	Bueno	(forthcoming)	suggests	that	there	was	no	such	underpinning	in	the	first	place,	offering	a	‘minimalist’	interpretation	of	the	London	and	Bauer	text,	stripped	of	any	phenomenological	reading.	I	think	such	a	claim	not	only	goes	against	London’s	own	stance	towards	his	work	in	physics	but	renders	problematic	Shimony’s	acknowledgement	of	such	a	reading.	
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sought	to	preserve	a	restricted	role	for	established	theory	and	techniques	whilst	setting	 forth	a	 future	 research	programme	based	on	new	 forms	of	 theorizing.	 ’	(ibid.,	p.	751).	And	of	course,	this	throws	further	doubt	on	the	reciprocal	sense	in	which	‘quantum	physics’	can	be	said	to	have	been	brought	into	being	by	contrast.	Thus,	 rather	 than	 the	rendering	 invisible	of	 revolutions	by	 the	 followers	of	 the	new	 paradigm,	 as	 Kuhn	 would	 have	 it,	 what	 we	 observe	 is	 physicists	constructing	a	 ‘classical’	 identity	for	their	forebears	in	order	to	serve	their	own	interests	(ibid.,	p.	722).		 Interwoven	with	 this	post-hoc	 establishment	of	 such	a	 contrast	 are	 two	further	strands:	first,	the	construction	of	the	Copenhagen	Interpretation	itself,	as	it	 has	 come	 to	 be	 understood,	 via	 a	 ‘dialogical’	 process	 in	 which	 different	principles	 and	 theoretical	 features	were	woven	 together	 in	 a	manner	 that	was	driven	by	the	contingent	forces	powering	the	debates	at	the	time	(Beller	1999).	Indeed,	 Beller	 argues	 that	 these	 principles	 and	 features	 themselves	 became	established	as	such	–	that	is,	as	features	of	the	emerging	theory	–	via	a	process	of	dialogue	between	the	scientists	concerned.		Likewise,	Camilleri	has	insisted	that	the	 Copenhagen	 Interpretation	 understood	 as	 a	 more-or-less	 unified	interpretation	‘of’	quantum	mechanics	only	came	into	focus	via	the	opposition	of	Soviet	scientists	(Camilleri	2009;	see	also	Freire	Jr	2015,	pp.	79-83).	 Secondly,	the	 characterization	 of	 the	 measurement	 problem	 as	 a	 problem,	 is	 something	that	appears	quite	 late	 in	 the	day	as	well.	de	Ronde	 (personal	 communication)	notes	 that	 the	 phrase	 ‘measurement	 problem’	 only	 begins	 to	 appear	 after	 the	mid-1940s	and	‘quantum	measurement	problem’	only	in	the	late	1960s.	Freire	Jr	notes	that	Wigner	was	of	the	first	to	use	the	phrase	(ibid.,	p.	142	and	records	that	‘[in]	the	second	half	of	the	1950s	there	was	a	rise	of	studies	on	the	measurement	problem	…’	(ibid.,	p.	86).		 This	provides	some	of	the	background	to	what	might	appear	to	have	been	an	 effacement	 of	 London’s	 phenomenological	 approach	 –	 instead	of	 the	 rise	 of	logical	positivism,	 as	 in	 the	 case	of	Weyl,	we	have	 the	 rise	of	 orthodoxy	 in	 the	form	 of	 the	 Copenhagen	 interpretation	 as	 quantum	 theory	 itself	 distinguishes	itself	 from	its	predecessor.	However	 I	want	 to	suggest	 that	 there	was	a	 further	factor	in	play	that	renders	this	 less	of	an	effacement	in	the	sense	that	holds	for	Weyl’s	 case	 and	 more	 like	 a	 co-option	 of	 London’s	 approach,	 minus	 its	
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phenomenological	 core,	 by	 no	 less	 a	 person	 than	Wigner.19	 As	 Freire	 Jr	 nicely	sets	out	(ibid.,	pp.149-161)	through	the	1950s	and	‘60s,	Wigner	attempted	to	re-shape	 the	conception	of	 the	orthodox	view	with	von	Neumann	at	 its	heart	and	Bohr	 displaced	 (just	 as	 Kuhn	 and	 others	 were	 setting	 up	 the	 Archives	 for	 the	
History	of	Quantum	Physics	which	can	be	viewed	as	a	manifestation	of	historians’	interest	in	the	theory;	ibid.,	p.	153).20	Thus,	in	his	famous	paper	with	Margenau	(who	 had	 previously	 criticised	 the	 phenomenological	 approach	 to	 physics;	 see	Margenau	1978),	he	wrote	 ‘According	to	von	Neumann	and	London	and	Bauer,	who	gave	the	most	compact	and	the	most	explicit	formulations	of	the	conceptual	structure	of	quantum	mechanics,	every	measurement	is	an	interaction	between	an	 object	 and	 an	 observer.’	 (Margenau	 and	 Wigner	 1962,	 p.	 292).	 And	 the	following	year,	he	noted	 ‘There	is	a	very	nice	little	book,	by	London	and	Bauer,	which	summarizes	quite	completely	what	I	shall	call	the	orthodox	view’	(Wigner	1963,	p.	7).		 Here	 we	 see	 quite	 explicitly	 the	 co-option	 of	 London	 and	 Bauer’s	approach	 but	 in	 order	 to	 ‘fit’	 that	 conception	 into	 the	 orthodox	 view	 the	phenomenological	 element	 must	 be	 quietly	 shoved	 off	 centre	 stage!21	Subsequently,	of	course,	it	is	Wigner’s	‘friend’	argument	that	becomes	the	focus	of	attention	and	also	the	subject	of	criticism	and	debate22	and	over	time	Wigner	came	to	recant	his	view	of	the	role	of	the	mind	in	this	context	(Freire	Jr.	2015,	p.	168).23	My	suggestion	then	is	that	it	was	not	the	case	that	the	London	and	Bauer	pamphlet	was	itself	effaced,	as	Weyl’s	work	was,	but	rather	that	its	central	point	was	 obscured	 by	 Wigner’s	 co-option	 of	 it	 as	 merely	 a	 summary	 of	 von	
																																																								19	Wigner	knew	London	from	their	time	in	Berlin	(when	Wigner	was	working	on	group	theory)	and	described	him	as	‘a	very	thoughtful,	very	industrious,	thorough,	imaginative	person.’	(Interview	with	Kuhn,	Session	II,	AIP	Oral	Histories	Archive).		20	Wigner’s	antipathy	to	Bohr’s	philosophy	of	complementarity	is	apparent	in	his	own	interview	with	Kuhn	from	these	archives	where	he	notes	that,	possibly	under	the	sway	of	von	Neumann,	the	duality	inherent	in	complementarity	is	not	reflected	in	the	formalism	where	one	can	easily	find	three	operators	that	do	not	commute,	such	as	in	the	case	of	spin	(Wigner	Interview	Session	III,	AIP	Oral	History	Archives).	Given	what	Bilban	suggests	in	(forthcoming),	this	displacement	may	be	construed	as	a	further	effacement	of	the	phenomenological	‘strand’	of	thought.		21	Here	Bueno	and	I	agree	on	the	role	of	Wigner	in	this	history.	22	For	a	recent	revival	of	the	argument,	that	I	also	think	can	be	handled	phenomenologically,	see	Frauchiger,	D.	and	Renner,	R.	(2016).	23	Further	evidence	of	the	effect	of	this	co-option	can	be	found	in	Freire	Jr’s	commentary	on	the	London	and	Bauer	pamphlet,	in	his	chapter	on	Wigner,	which	makes	no	mention	of	London’s	phenomenological	background.	
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Neumann’s	 view	 as	 part	 of	 his	 campaign	 to	 re-orient	 the	 discipline’s	understanding	of	its	foundations.24		
A	New	Hope?	There	is,	as	there	always	is,	more	to	say	about	the	history.	However,	let	me	now	turn	 to	 the	question:	Can	we	 recover,	 via	 the	London	and	Bauer	manuscript,	 a	phenomenological	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics?	I	will	not	pretend	to	be	able	 to	 offer	 a	 complete	 answer	 here	 but	 I	 hope	 I	 can	 at	 least	 sketch	 some	possible	fruitful	directions	in	this	regard	(see	French	forthcoming).25		 Let	me	begin	by	noting	that,	first,	such	an	interpretation	will	not	fit	neatly	into	 the	 space	 defined	 by	 the	 axes	 of	 the	 realism-antirealism	 debate	 and,	secondly,	neither	will	it	compare	straightforwardly	with	the	most	well-known	of	the	current	interpretations	of	quantum	mechanics.			 With	 regard	 to	 that	 first	 point,	 there	 have	 been	 attempts	 to	 render	phenomenology	(more	or	less)	compatible	with	realism	(see	for	example	Hardy	2013).	 It	 has	 also	 been	 compared	 to	 anti-realist	 lines	 of	 thought,	 such	 as	constructive	 empiricism	 (see	 Wiltsche	 2012).	 Although	 there	 are	 interesting	points	of	comparison	made	here,	I	shall	adopt	the	more	widely	accepted	stance	that	phenomenology	sits	askew	both	(traditional)	idealism	and	current	forms	of	realism	 and	 anti-realism,	 not	 least	 insofar	 as	 it	 denies	 the	 ‘philosophical	absolutizing’	 of	 the	world	 inherent	 to	metaphysical	 realism	 (see	 Zahavi	 2017).	Here	I	shall	take	that	as	amounting	to	the	denial	of	the		‘absolutizing’	of	the	state	of	the	system	with	the	concomitant	explication	of	the	constitution	of	the	system	as	an	object	of	knowledge	via	the	correlative	relationship	in	which	consciousness	and	the	system	stand	(ibid.);	that	is,	in	terms	of	the	mutually	dependent	context	of	
being (Beck 1928). 	 Regarding	the	second	point,	it	is	commonplace	to	remark	that	there	is	an	extensive	 underdetermination	 of	 interpretation	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 quantum	mechanics	 (French	and	Saatsi	 forthcoming).	Skipping	over	a	 lot	of	nuances,	we	
																																																								24	And	as	Freire	Jr	also	notes	(2015	p.	150)	as	part	of	that	re-orientation,	Wigner	maintained	that	the	measurement	problem	should	not	be	dismissed	as	philosophy	of	physics	but	should	be	regarded	as	a	fundamental	part	of	physics	itself.	25	Of	course,	such	considerations	should	not	ignore	the	prior	work	of	Heelan,	for	example	and	in	this	context	see	his	2004.	
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can	 in	 effect	 draw	 another	 set	 of	 axes:	 along	 one,	 we	 have	 various	 forms	 of	‘primitive	ontology’,	based	on	a	consideration	of	material	entities	in	space-time.	For	the	Bohmian,	in	her	current	guise,	these	will	be	particles	with	position	as	a	privileged	 observable	 (corresponding	 to	 a	 not-so-hidden	 variable).26	 For	 the	advocate	of	the	GRW	view,	these	will	be	rendered	either	in	terms	of	the	matter-field	or	flashes	plus	a	new	physical	constant	that,	in	effect,	‘clumps’	the	field	and	‘sparks’	 (in	 a	 sense)	 the	 flashes	 (at	 the	 same	 space-time	 points).	 For	 the	phenomenologist,	 all	 such	 interpretations	 get	 off	 on	 the	wrong	 foot,	 of	 course,	not	 least	by	 assuming	an	unproblematic	 reification	of	 the	notion	of	 a	 ‘material	entity’.		 Along	 another	 axis	we	might	 situate	 those	 interpretations	 that	 take	 the	theory	 ‘literally’	 or	 ‘as	 is’,	 the	 most	 prominent	 being	 the	 Everettian	 or	 ‘many	worlds’	 interpretation.	 This,	 perhaps,	 bears	 closer	 comparison	 with	 a	phenomenological	 approach	 than	 the	 above	 interpretations,	 not	 least	 because	Everett’s	 core	 relativisation	 of	 the	 quantum	 state	 brings	 it	 closer	 to	 the	correlative	framework	of	a	phenomenological	view.	One	might	also	dwell	a	little	on	the	fact	that	 in	 its	current	revival,	 the	interpretation	depends	on	a	decision-theoretic	device	in	order	to	recover	the	crucial	‘Born	rule’	of	quantum	mechanics	(which	 specifies,	 in	 its	 simplest	 form,	 that	 the	probability	density	 for	 finding	 a	particle	 at	 a	 certain	 position	 is	 given	 by	 the	 modulus	 squared	 of	 the	 wave-function	 at	 that	 position).	 Here	 one	 could	 speculate	 that	 a	 subjective	 element	creeps	 into	 the	 interpretation,	or,	at	 least,	a	certain	view,	albeit	widely	held,	of	what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 rational	 that	 underpins	 this	 device.	 I	 shall	 come	 back	 to	 this,	briefly.			 It	 is	also	 interesting	 that	Everett,	 in	his	 ‘long’	 thesis	of	1956,	 introduced	an	 ‘amusing,	but	extremely	hypothetical	drama’	 (Barrett	and	Byrne	2012	p.	74)	
																																																								26	Again	in	his	interview	with	Kuhn,	Wigner	asks	(AIP	session	III):	‘Why	is	it	that	we	always	see	positions	macroscopically?	Position	operator	is	just	an	operator	like	every	other	operator.	What	is	it	that	makes	our	minds	principally	think	in	terms	of	position	operators?	Why	are	there	macroscopic	bodies?	Why	do	they	have	definite	positions	rather	than	having	another,	arbitrary,	wave	function,	or	another,	arbitrary,	operator	measured?	I	may	be	completely	wrong,	but	I	do	feel	that	there	is	some	mystery	here	not	completely	cleared	up.	Several	times	I’ve	had	ideas	on	this	but	nothing	really	convincing.’	
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which	is,	in	fact,	a	version	of	Wigner’s	‘friend’	argument.27	However,	the	upshot	of	 the	 argument	 is	 different:	 for	 Wigner	 it	 demonstrated	 the	 role	 of	consciousness	 in	 ‘solving’	 the	 measurement	 problem,	 whereas	 for	 Everett	 it	showed	what	was	wrong	with	the	‘orthodox’	view	as	simply	stated	(and	here	he	followed	Wigner	in	taking	von	Neumann	as	representative	of	that	view),	thereby	clearing	the	way	for	his	‘relative	state’	interpretation.	There	is,	again,	more	to	say	(not	 least	 about	 the	 many	 minds	 variant	 of	 this	 interpretation)	 but	 from	 a	phenomenological	perspective,	the	initial	move	of	taking	the	theory	literally	also	gets	off	on	the	wrong	foot,	albeit	a	different	one!		 More	 fruitful	 comparisons	might	perhaps	be	drawn	by	 focussing	on	 the	
correlative	 relationship	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Dieks’	 perspectivalism	 or	 Rovelli’s	relationalism.	 Running	 throughout	 such	 accounts	 one	 finds	 a	 concern	 with	including	consciousness,	or	not.	Thus	Dieks	writes:		‘The	appeal	to	consciousness	…	appears	to	invoke	a	deus	ex	machina,	devised	for	the	express	purpose	of	reconciling	unitary	evolution	with	definite	measurement	results.	More	generally,	the	hypothesis	that	the	definiteness	of	the	physical	world	only	arises	as	the	result	of	the	intervention	of	(human?)	consciousness	does	not	sit	well	with	the	method	of	physics.’	(Dieks,	2018,	p.	4)				 However,	from	a	phenomenological	perspective,	of	course,	consciousness	is	 invoked	 not	 as	 a	 deus	 ex	 machina	 but	 as	 that	 which	 provides	 the	 ‘ultimate	court	 of	 appeal	 of	 all	 knowledge’	 (Ryckman	 2005,	 p.	 142).	 If	 we	 then	 take	 as	central	 the	 correlative	 relationship	 by	 which	 mind	 and	 world	 are	 bound	constitutively	 together	 (Zahavi	 2017,	 p.	 117),	 understood	 in	 the	 quantum	context,	we	can	perhaps	retain	the	advantages	of	relationist-type	interpretations	without	having	to	invoke	a	multiplicity	of	worlds	or	of	minds.	In	this	regard,	as	I	said,	I	can	only	offer	a	sketch	here	but	the	fully-fledged	interpretation	(if	it	could	be	achieved)	should	at	least	incorporate	the	following	considerations.		 First	of	all,	it	goes	without	saying	that	the	nature	of	the	‘state’	in	quantum	mechanics	 is	 problematic	 (an	 issue	 that	 can	 perhaps	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 Bohr’s																																																									27	As	Barrett	and	Byrne	note	(op.	cit.,	p.	29,	fn	2),	Everett	took	a	class	with	Wigner	on	Methods	of	Mathematical	Physics	at	Princeton	in	1954	and	presented	this	version	of	the	‘Wigner’s	Friend’	argument	some	years	before	Wigner’s	appeared	in	print.	
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introduction	of	the	‘stationary’	state).	From	a	phenomenological	perspective,	the	mutually	dependent	context	of	being	implies	that	the	traditional	notion	of	state	(as	 non-relational	 or	 intrinsic	 or	 more	 broadly,	 mind	 independent)	 must	 be	abandoned.	 From	 this	 standpoint,	 ‘systems’	 do	 not	 possess	 states	 in	 and	 of	themselves	 independently	 of	 observers	 and	 in	 this	 regard,	 again,	 there	 is	 an	obvious	 point	 of	 comparison	 with	 perspectival/relational/relative	 state	approaches.	However,	 this	 should	not	be	understood	 in	 terms	of	 some	 form	of	‘splitting’	 of	 reality;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 there	 is	 but	 one	 ‘world’	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 a	reality,	 comprised	 of	 the	 relevant	 systems,	 that	 is	 transcendent	 but	 there	 are	many	 contexts	 of	 being,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 states	 of	 these	 systems	 are	dependent	on	consciousness.			 The	obvious	question,	then,	is	why	are	certain	states	preferred?	(this	is,	in	effect,	 the	 so-called	basis	 problem).	One	 can	 take	 a	 leaf	 out	 of	 the	Everettian’s	book	here	and	appeal	to	decoherence,	whereby	the	interaction	between	a	system	and	the	environment	(where	the	latter	has	many	more	degrees	of	freedom	than	the	former)	leads	to	the	suppression	of	interference	between	certain	states	that	are	robust	in	the	sense	that	information	about	them	is	stored	redundantly	in	the	environment.	 The	 observer	 can	 then	 recover	 that	 information	without	 further	disturbing	 the	 system	 (see	 Bacciagaluppi	 2016).	 We	 can	 then	 answer	 why	position	 is	privileged	 in	 the	way	 it	 is	 (answering	Wigner’s	 concern	above	 in	 fn	20):	 the	 interaction	 potentials	 are	 functions	 of	 position	 and	 thus	 the	 states	effectively	 picked	 out	 by	 decoherence	 tend	 to	 be	 localised	 in	 position.	 Hence,	subsequent	to	the	‘separation’	of	observer	and	system,	position	states	come	to	be	preferred.			 But	of	 course,	 as	 is	now	widely	 recognised,	decoherence	 in	 and	of	 itself	does	not	‘solve’	the	measurement	problem,	because	the	combination	of	system	+	apparatus	+	environment	will	 still	 be	 in	a	 superposition.	 It	 is	only	 through	 the	action	of	the	conscious	observer,	by	engaging	in	the	crucial	act	of	reflection	and	distinguishing	 herself	 as	 the	 ‘ego-pole’,	 that	 the	 relevant	 separation	 between	system	and	observer	can	be	achieved.		 There	remains	the	further	worry,	prevalent	throughout	the	discussions	of	both	the	von	Neumann	and	London	and	Bauer	approaches,	that	allowing	a	role	for	 consciousness	 in	 this	 regard	 introduces	 a	 fatal	 element	 of	 subjectivity	 and	
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undermines	 the	 objectivity	 of	 not	 just	 quantum	 mechanics	 but	 physics	 as	 a	whole.	 Let	 us	 return	 to	 London	 and	 Bauer,	who	write	 that	 understanding	 this	concept	 of	 objectivity	 involves	 ‘...	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 necessary	 and	sufficient	conditions	for	an	object	of	thought	to	possess	“objectivity”	and	to	be	an	object	of	science’	(1983,	p.	259).	They	continue,	 ‘...	Husserl	 ...	has	systematically	studied	 such	 questions	 and	 has	 thus	 created	 a	 new	 method	 of	 investigation	called	“Phenomenology”’	(ibid.;	here	they	refer	to	both	the	Logical	Investigations	and	Ideas).	The	classical	concept	of	objectivity	is	dismissed	as	‘useless	and	even	incorrect,	 [generating]	 actual	 obstacles	 to	 progress’	 (ibid.).	 It	 is	 the	phenomenological	 concept	 which	 is	 now	 sufficient	 for	 physics'	 needs,	 in	 the	sense	that	‘[t]he	transcendency	belonging	to	the	physical	thing	as	determined	by	the	physics	is	the	transcendency	belonging	to	a	being	which	becomes	constituted	in,	 and	 tied	 to,	 consciousness.’	 (Husserl	 1983,	 p.	 123).	 Taking	 objectivity	 to	 be	cashed	out	in	terms	of	a	transcendency	that	is	independent	of	or	separated	from	a	knowing	consciousness	is	what	has	generated	many	of	the	problems	associated	with	 quantum	physics	 (and	 also,	Weyl	might	 say,	 relativity	 theory)	 in	 the	 first	place.	 To	 overcome	 these	 problems	 the	 phenomenologist	 insists	 on	 objectivity	itself	being	constituted	by	consciousness.		 How,	 then,	 is	 inter-subjective	 agreement	 to	 be	 established?	Here	we	 can	take	 a	 leaf	 out	 of	 the	 book	 of	 relational	 quantum	mechanics	 (see	Rovelli	 1996	and	Laudisa	and	Rovelli	2013)	and	note	that	establishing	such	agreement	 itself	involved	a	physical	 interaction.	 So,	 consider	 a	 simple	 arrangement	of	 a	 system	that	can	be	in	spin	up	or	down	and	a	measurement	device	that	can	indicate	‘up’	or	 ‘down’	 (this	 is	 adapted	 from	 Laudisa	 and	 Rovelli	 2013).	 Assume	 the	interaction	 between	 the	 two	 is	 such	 that	 when	 the	 system	 is	 in	 state	 ‘spin	up/down’	the	measurement	device	records	‘up/down’	and	observer1	observes	a	reading	of	‘up’	or	‘down’	accordingly.	The	system	starts	in	a	superposition	of	spin	up	 and	 spin	 down,	 interacts	 with	 the	 measurement	 device,	 and	 the	 observer	takes	 the	 reading,	 yielding	 a	particular	mental	 ‘state’	 upon	 reflection,	which	of	course	would	be	either		‘I	see	a	reading	of	‘up’’	or	‘I	see	a	reading	of	‘down’’.	But	we	 can	 consider	 the	 system	 +	 measurement	 device	 +	 observer1	 as	 itself	 as	system,	observed	by	observer2.	From	this	perspective,	prior	to	observer2	taking	a	reading,	 the	whole	composite	must	be	regarded	as	 in	a	superposition	(here	we	
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recall	 the	 flexibility	 in	 the	 von	 Neumann	 ‘cut’	 between	 measured	 system	 and	measuring	 system).	Observer2	 can	 then	 take	 a	 reading,	 there	 is	 a	 reflective	 act	and	she	too	will	say	either	‘I	see	a	reading	of	 ‘up’’	or	 ‘I	see	a	reading	of	 ‘down’’.	When	 observer1	 and	 observer2	 then	 compare	 their	 results	 there	 will	 be	 no	contradiction	 because	 that	 comparison	must	 itself	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 physical	interaction	describable	by	quantum	mechanics.			 As	 Laudisa	 and	 Rovelli	 remark,	 ‘This	 internal	 self-consistency	 of	 the	quantum	formalism	is	general,	and	it	is	perhaps	its	most	remarkable	aspect.	This	self	consistency	is	taken	in	relational	quantum	mechanics	as	a	strong	indication	of	the	relational	nature	of	the	world.’	(ibid.)	Note	that	this	can	be	adapted	to	the	phenomenological	 case	 precisely	 because	 on	 the	 London	 and	 Bauer	 picture,	consciousness	 is	not	 set	outwith	 the	wave	 function	but,	 rather,	 the	observer	 is	taken	 to	 be	 embraced	 by	 the	 theory	 too,	 so	 that	 the	 latter’s	 internal	 self-consistency	applies	in	this	case	also.	Of	course,	for	Rovelli	the	relations	that	make	up	 the	 ‘nature	 of	 the	world’	 are	 physical	 relations,	 understood	 from	 a	 broadly	naturalistic	viewpoint,	but	there	doesn’t	seem	to	be	any	obstacle	in	principle	to	situating	them	within	a	correlationist	framework.		 There	remains	 the	 issue	of	accommodating	and,	more	generally,	making	sense	 of	 probabilities	 within	 such	 an	 interpretation.	 Here	 we	 might	 recall	London	and	Bauer’s	emphasis	on	the	free	creation	of	objectivity,	reminiscent	as	it	is	 of	 Husserl’s	 remark	 that,	 ‘...	 we	 persistently	 create	 for	 ourselves	 new	configurations	 of	 objects	 ...	 which	 have	 for	 us	 lasting	 reality.	 If	 we	 engage	 in	radical	self-examination	-	 that	 is,	return	to	our	ego	 ...	 -	 then	all	 these	 forms	are	seen	 to	 be	 creations	 of	 spontaneous	 “I”-activity	 ...	 There	 we	 also	 find	 all	 the	sciences,	 which,	 through	 my	 own	 thinking	 and	 perceiving,	 I	 bring	 to	 reality	within	myself’	(Husserl	1964	p.	30;	my	emphasis).	Insofar	as	we	freely	create	a	new	 objectivity	 through	 this	 regard	 that	 separates	 the	 ego-pole	 from	 the	superposition,	 one	 can	 speculate	 that	 it	 is	 the	 spontaneous	 ‘I’-activity	 that	generates	the	relevant	quantum	probabilities.28	Note,	 first	of	all,	 that	this	 is	not	to	subscribe	to	some	form	of	the	‘epistemic’	approach	to	probability	in	quantum	mechanics,	 given,	 of	 course,	 that	 the	 distinction	 indicated	 by	 this	 label	 is																																																									28	The	notion	of	freedom	being	employed	here	plays	a	major	role	with	regard	to	the	phenomenological	epoché	in	general.	
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inapplicable	in	this	context.	Note,	furthermore,	that	the	above	freedom	does	not	imply	 that	 such	 creation	 and	 the	 separation	 (or	 ‘collapse’	 on	 a	 non-phenomenological	reading)	are	somehow	subject	to	our	will!		 That's	 all	 well	 and	 good	 but	 the	 question	 remains	 how	 can	 the	probabilities	 in	 this	 interpretation	 agree	 with	 those	 of	 textbook	 quantum	mechanics	 (cf.	 Greaves	 2007)?	 Here	 again	 we	 can	 steal	 a	 page	 from	 someone	else’s	 book,	 literally.	 In	 Wallace’s	 exposition	 of	 the	 Everettian	 interpretation	(Wallace	 2012),	 as	 touched	 on	 above,	 the	 Born	 rule	 is	 recovered	 via	considerations	 based	 on	 decision	 theory,	 itself	 understood	 as	 embodying	 the	core	features	of	rational	behaviour.	It	is	via	our	understanding	of	such	behaviour,	it	 is	 claimed,	 that	 probability	 makes	 contact	 with	 the	 world.	 The	phenomenologist	can	appropriate	that	approach,	and	the	relevant	formal	proofs,	but,	of	 course,	would	give	 the	underlying	understanding	of	 rationality	her	own	interpretation.	As	Zahavi	states,	reflection	is	a	pre-condition	for	the	kind	of	self-critical	 deliberation	 involved	 in	 such	 behaviour	 and,	 as	 he	 says,	 ‘If	 we	 are	 to	subject	our	different	beliefs	and	desires	 to	a	critical,	normative	evaluation,	 it	 is	not	 sufficient	 simply	 to	 have	 immediate	 first-personal	 access	 to	 the	 states	 in	question.	 Rather,	we	 need	 to	 deprive	 our	 ongoing	mental	 activities	 from	 their	automatic	normative	force	by	stepping	back	from	them.’	(2017,	p.	23).	 In	other	words,	 we	 need	 to	 effect	 the	 core	 phenomenological	 move	 by	 engaging	 in	 a	reflective	self-distancing	through	which	we	enter	into	a	critical	relationship	with	our	mental	states.	Zahavi	continues,	‘To	live	in	the	phenomenological	attitude	is	for	Husserl	not	simply	a	neutral	impersonal	occupation,	but	a	praxis	of	decisive	personal	and	existential	significance	…’	(ibid.,	p.	23).			 There	 are	 also	 alternatives	 of	 course,	 In	 their	 review	of	Wallace’s	 book,	Bacciagaluppi	 and	 Ismael	 note	 that	 ‘Although	 the	 proof	 of	 the	 Born	 Rule	 is	formulated	within	 the	 decision-theoretic	 framework,	 the	mathematical	 core	 of	the	 proof	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 it:	 as	Wallace	 remarks,	 it	 ʻ… establishes	 that	 if	probability	 basically	 makes	 sense,	 and	 has	 the	 usual	 qualitative	 features,	 in	unitary	quantum	mechanics,	 then	quantitatively	 it	 is	given	by	the	Born	ruleʼ	…’	(Baccigaluppi	and	Ismael	2015,	p.	141).	As	they	go	on	to	note,	one	could	take	the	Born	 rule	 to	 be	merely	 a	 phenomenological	 (not	 in	 our	 sense!)	 add-on	 to	 the	theoretical	structure	of	quantum	mechanics,	but	then	the	worry	is	that	one	loses	
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any	 theoretical	 underpinning	 for	 it.	 However,	 ‘…	 Gleasonʼs	 theorem	 provides	another	natural	way	of	justifying	the	Born	Rule	(perfectly	acceptable	as	part	of	a	pragmatic	 justification).	 And	 to	 do	 justice	 to	 Everett,	 he	 presents	 such	 a	theoretical	argument	himself.’	 (ibid.,	 	p.	142;	as	 they	note,	Everett	understands	the	Born	rule	in	terms	of	a	typicality	measure,	rather	than	a	credence	measure	as	Wallace	 does).29	 It	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 again,	 there	 is	 nothing	 in	 principle	 that	prevents	 the	 phenomenologist	 from	 adapting	 any	 of	 these	 justifications	 and	indeed,	some	of	the	earlier	discussions	of	this	issue	in	the	context	of	the	many-minds	 variant	 of	 the	 Everettian	 interpretation	 appear	 to	 sail	within	 reach	 of	 a	phenomenological	understanding	(see	French	forthcoming).			 Finally,	and	briefly,	 there	 is	 the	well-known	claim	that	 the	Everettian	or	many	worlds	view	 is	 the	only	 interpretation	that	 is	relativistically	kosher	as	all	other	interpretations	assume	a	privileged	reference	frame	(this	is	a	criticism	that	has	been	 levelled	at	 the	Bohmian	 interpretation	 in	particular	 given	 the	 central	role	 played	 by	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 configuration,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 simultaneous	position	of	all	the	particles).	Here	we	might	bring	Weyl	back	into	the	picture:	the	separation	of	the	‘I’	from	the	mutual	dependency	to	yield	a	definite	result	should	not	be	understood	in	terms	of	establishing	such	a	privileged	frame;	rather,	if	we	understand	 any	 such	 frame	 of	 reference	 as	 ‘the	 necessary	 residue	 of	 the	 ego-extinction’,	 to	 use	 Weyl’s	 phrase,	 we	 can	 de-privilege	 it,	 as	 it	 were,	 by	emphasising	its	subjective	character.			
Conclusion	I	 noted	 in	 the	 introduction	 Ryckman’s	 point	 that	 Weyl’s	 theory	 has	 an	‘ambiguous	character’	in	that	it	lay	‘in	the	intersection	of	physics	and	philosophy’	(2005	p.	159).	The	question	can	be	asked,	where,	 then,	does	 the	measurement	problem	lie?	Or,	relatedly,	is	the	L&B	account	physics	or	philosophy?	The	answer	may	 seem	 both	 contestable	 and	 historically	 contingent.	 According	 to	 many	physicists,	 for	 many	 years,	 the	 measurement	 problem	 was	 dismissed	 as	 a																																																									29	Gleason’s	theorem	essentially	states	that	the	Born	rule	follows	from	the	lattice	structure	of	events	in	Hilbert	space.	One	would	of	course	have	to	give	a	phenomenological	reading	of	this	structure.	Alternatively,	one	might	adopt	Everett’s	argument	that	that	an	observer’s	relative	measurement	records	in	a	typical	branch	would	be	randomly	distributed	according	to	the	standard	quantum	probabilities	and	establish	a	phenomenologically	appropriate	‘typicality	measure’	(for	a	useful	discussion	of	such	measures	see	Barrett	2017.	
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philosophical	 concern.	 As	 indicated	 above,	Wigner	 disagreed	 and	 so,	 I	 hazard,	would	London	and	Bauer,	insofar	as	they	saw	physics	as	implying	a	theory	of	the	relationship	between	the	object	and	the	observer.	In	this	respect,	their	approach	does	not	suffer	from	any	ambiguity,	since	from	their	perspective,	to	‘do’	physics	is	to	‘do’	philosophy!		 Sadly,	whether	it	is	regarded	as	effaced	or	co-opted,	London	and	Bauer’s	approach	 to	 the	 measurement	 problem	 has	 been	 lost	 to	 the	 majority	 of	philosophers	 of	 physics.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 phenomenological	 perspective	 that	 it	embodies	 has	 not	 been	 properly	 explored	 and	 evaluated.	 Here	 I’ve	 merely	indicated	possible	avenues	down	which	such	an	exploration	might	proceed	but	even	 if	 one	 is	 not	 phenomenologically	 inclined,	 as	 it	 were,	 such	 explorations	should	 be	 interesting,	 for	 the	 possible	 alternative	 understanding	 of	 quantum	mechanics	that	they	may	reveal	and	for	the	contrast	they	thereby	offer	to	current	interpretations	that	have	been	worn	thin	through	repeated	examination.			
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